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 1 
The Origins of Modern Nationalism in the North Atlantic 
Interaction Sphere 
 
 
Our revolution has often been attributed to that of America: in fact the 
American Revolution had a lot of influence on the French Revolution, but less 
because of what was then done in the United States than because of what was 
being thought at the same time in France.  While in the rest of Europe the 
American Revolution was still nothing but a new and unusual fact, among us 
it only made more evident and more striking what we thought we already 
knew.  It astonished Europe; here it completed our conversion.  The 
Americans seemed merely to apply what our writers had thought of: they gave 
substantial reality to what we were dreaming about. 
  --Alexis de Tocqueville, Volume One of The Old Regime,  
    1856, (in Zunz and Kahan 2002: 306).  
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article critically engages scholarly narratives about the origins of modern 
nationalism that locate it in a history of European social evolution, a narrative 
sometimes criticised for its Eurocentric bias (e.g. Chatterjee 1993, Drakulic 2008).  It 
qualifies the idea of nationalism’s European origins, arguing for a geographic shift in 
focus towards a wider social sphere defined by European populations on both sides of 
the North Atlantic Ocean, both colonial settlers and Europeans in situ, but also 
influenced by indigenous American societies, enslaved populations, communities 
founded on Protestant faith, and the peculiar interstitial micro-societies engendered by 
sea-going livelihoods.  More generally, it seeks to reframe the social and symbolic 
milieu in which new imaginings of national communities took shape (Anderson 
1991).  The argument is that this field of ideas and opinions is best understood not 
simply as the outcome of a European intellectual genealogy, although that is an 
important element, but also as the effect of a rapidly changing transatlantic network of 
interrelated societies, that were characterised by an intensification of processes of 
communication, and crucially, experiencing new strains and demands on increasingly 
antiquated and inadequate systems of political authority and legitimation.  After 
outlining standard accounts of the origins of modern nationalism, I propose framing 
the question in terms of the concept of the ‘interaction sphere’, borrowed from 
archaeology, and the field of ‘Atlantic history’ that has flourished in recent decades.  
The main body of the article elaborates this perspective, before drawing conclusions. 
 
In the spirit of Charles Tilly, the article interrogates a process of large-scale social 
change (1985a), shaped by contentious politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2006) and interstate 
competition (1975).  Tilly’s work is so vast that almost anything one writes can be 
connected to it in several ways, and some connections will be highlighted below.  
Most fundamentally however, in terms of constructing explanatory social scientific 
narratives, I share his inclination toward what he called ‘encompassing comparisons’ 
(1985a: 147). That is, toward understanding a single complex historical process 
(modern nation formation) by examining how particular cases variably fit into that 
process, and correspondingly, to understand particular cases (revolutionary 
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nationalisms) according to how they are situated within that larger process.  The 
concept of the interaction sphere is meant to facilitate this way of approaching things.  
This article offers an initial reframing of large-scale narratives about how nationalism 
first arose, primarily using secondary historical sources.  Further empirical research 
will hopefully help substantiate its claims by reconstructing eighteenth-century 
transatlantic social interactions, networks, interlocking biographies, and repertoires of 
contention. At that stage Tilly’s notion of ‘relational realism’—that analysis should 
begin with attention to concrete social ties and interactions (2008: 7-8)—already 
implicit in this article, would come more fully into play. 
 
 
Reframing the Origins of Modern Nationalism 
 
Most accounts of the rise of nationalism place it squarely in the context of European 
social development (e.g. Bendix 1978, Breuilly 1993, Gellner 1997, Hobsbawm 1992, 
Mann 1986)1.  Usually the narrative pivots around a longish Eighteenth Century (say 
1688 to 1830) in which economic transformation and political crises in the seaboard 
dynasties of Western Europe issue forth in the first modern nation-states, based on 
notions of popular sovereignty, and driven by intensified commercial and military 
competition.  From this pivot, the story frequently looks back in time to ideological 
precursors in the Renaissance and the struggles of the Reformation, and forward to 
the spread of this model eastward across the archaic Habsburg, Ottoman and Russian 
Empires, and finally across the globe as part of post-World War Two decolonisation, 
with the latest chapter of nationalist movements being triggered by the collapse of the 
USSR in 1989.     
 
Within this paradigm there are significant variants.  The present argument engages 
particularly with those offered by Liah Greenfeld, Benedict Anderson, and Charles 
Tilly.  Greenfeld (1992) pinpoints sixteenth-century England as the source of modern 
nationalism, focussing on how Tudor monarchs consolidated their power bases by 
strategically expanding the aristocracy, thereby creating a reconfigured elite with a 
greater need to look downward into the populous for legitimation.  Consolidating a 
Protestant-English identity in the face of counter-reformation persecutions, this new 
class led the way in the formation of the first truly national identity, which would 
subsequently spread outward, by imitation, across Europe and the world.  While I 
recognise the seminal role of England, I instead see its history and traditions of 
political conflict feeding into the ideology of the American Revolution as its most 
important impact. 
 
Anderson’s (1991) well-known thesis that nations are ‘imagined communities’ made 
possible by modern communication based on the printed word and expanded literacy, 
was linked to the claim that people of European birth or descent in the Americas 
(‘creoles’) were the true seedbed of this new national worldview.  According to 
Anderson, the exceptionally literate, governing strata of this population found itself 
structurally confined in its careers and social horizons, to the provinces of various 
New World colonies, socially unequal to their political masters in the European 
homeland, and unable to advance their interests beyond the colonial context (see 
Figure 1).  So constrained, they naturally began to identify as people’s of these 
colonies, which eventually became nations.  This new paradigm in turn was imported 
back across the Atlantic, thus secondarily shaping the strategies of nation-building in 
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the European homeland. Oddly, Anderson focuses this argument primarily on the 
colonies of New Spain, which in many ways were the least innovative (see below), 
treating the much more dynamic and innovative British colonies of North America as 
almost secondary.  I share Anderson’s emphasis on the New World context, and his 
interest in the forces that shape the imagining of communities, but I take issue with 
his misplaced emphasis on the Spanish colonies.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 1, Courtesy of the University of Texas. 
 
 
Tilly (1975) argued early on that nation formation was a process that took place 
between as well as within states.  He emphasised the competitive, interactive dynamic 
of modernising states in Europe, as the fiscal and personnel demands of warfare 
accelerated the development of armies and navies, systems of national debt and 
taxation, government bureaucracy, and ideas of citizenship and rights.  As he 
aphorised, ‘war makes states’ as much as states make war (1985b: 170).  I follow 
Tilly in believing that modern nations took shape as part of a multi-centred 
competitive dynamic, not through the endogenous development of single societies, 
but I shift the centre of gravity of the analysis toward the mid-Atlantic, to an arena of 
transatlantic imperial competition.  Tilly was of course mindful of the imperial 
dimension, but saw this as anchored in Europe among European states, treating 
developments in the American colonies as more marginal, where I see these as at least 
half the story. 
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Now for the conceptual tools and frame of my own analysis.  I borrow the term 
‘interaction sphere’ (Caldwell 1964) from archaeology, where it was coined to help 
conceptualise cultural interconnections among distinct communities within wider 
regions, sharing common ecological conditions and traditions, and often historical and 
genealogical links.   The idea of the interaction sphere was to shift focus to the 
communication and exchange relations among networks of elite groups within these 
communities, suggesting that it was this process, rather than ecological pressures or 
the inertia of traditions, that best accounted for the cultural continuities suggested by 
the material record (Friedel 1979, Gilmore 1982).  I transpose the term here from 
archaeology to sociological history, because it succinctly signals the emphasis I want 
to place on a social space defined by interactions, albeit not ‘elite’ in the narrowest 
sense of the term.  My purpose is to try to define the main discursive horizons within 
which the idea of ‘the nation’ took its recognisably modern shape. 
 
Acknowledging this terminological pilfering, the argument also fits within the 
historiographic trend that has come to be known as ‘Atlantic history’ (see Greene and 
Morgan 2009).  On the model of Braudel’s (1972) history of the Mediterranean world, 
this approach attempts to view the Atlantic Ocean as the logical frame for 
investigating an array of interpenetrating socio-historical processes. At its broadest, it 
becomes simply a geographic container for any number of diverse historical 
investigations (Bodl 2009; Games 2006).  Three major historical foci have coalesced 
to some degree under this banner: the transatlantic slave trade (e.g. Gilroy 1993), 
colonial societies of the Americas (e.g. Bailyn 1986, see Steele 2007), and the history 
of Atlantic oriented Empires (e.g. Gould and Onuf 2005).  But alongside these major 
currents, many others flow, including histories of: demography and migration; 
environmental, ecological and epidemiological impact; the movement of 
commodities; and naval and coastal ways of life.    
 
Within this vast field my focus is specifically on the North Atlantic, and that field of 
interactions defined especially by the competing spheres of colonisation and imperial 
pretension defined by Britain and France (and earlier and to a lesser degree by the 
Dutch), and oriented primarily to the North American continent.  This was roughly 
the zone defined by the infamous ‘triangle trade’ of slaves from West Africa, basic 
commodities from the Caribbean and North American colonies, and manufactured 
goods from Europe.  While eschewing geographical determinism, it is worth noting 
the equatorial calms and prevailing currents helped reinforce this division of the 
Atlantic into northern and southern spheres for navigators by sail, with traffic to and 
from Europe proceeding much more rapidly in the northern hemisphere (Steele 2007: 
52) (See Figure 2).  However, the demarcation here has more to do with the very 
different process of conquest and colonisation prosecuted by the Iberians in New 
Spain, based on the reproduction of a manorial system in the New World interior, and 
the pursuit of precious metals.  To the north the British trading empire led to a pattern 
of widespread land-holding, both large and small, and merchant-based coastal towns.  
But most fundamentally, this North Atlantic interaction sphere was driven by diverse 
trade, suffused with the ideologies of the Reformation and later the Enlightenment, 
and governed by systems of monarchical absolutism that were gradually being pushed 
to their limits.  This sphere has a temporal centre of gravity as well.  Anchored by the 
pivotal events of the American and French Revolutions, framed by a long Eighteenth 
Century, and trailing into the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Centuries at either end.  
The idea of the modern nation emerges out of this welter of thought and experience, 
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triggered by transatlantic contact, and the particular tensions in conceptions of polity 
and community that developed on both sides of the Atlantic in this period, feeding on 
one another.  
 
 
 
Figure 2, Courtesy University of Texas. 
 
 
Imagining Nations in the North Atlantic Interaction Sphere 
 
I construct an analytic account through three comparative concepts: empires, 
revolutions, and interstitial communities, emphasising significant differences of social 
and political structures under each of these headings.   
 
Empires  
 
Atlantic history gets accused of being ‘merely imperial history in a more acceptable 
guise’ (Morgan and Greene 2009: 6-9).  It is clearly more than this, but the history of 
European empires is unavoidably central to understanding the process in question (see 
Figure 3).  Most basically, we need to appreciate the differences between the three 
major imperial systems, and why it was the predominantly North Atlantic empires of 
Britain and France that became the first seedbeds for political and social revolution, 
and new ideas of polity based on notions citizenship, rights, liberty and equality.  
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The first question is why the Spanish empire was a ‘late developer’ when it came to 
republican revolution, reacting to the impact of the American and French Revolutions, 
rather than leading (Elliott 2006: 391).  In part, the Spanish Empire showed the 
inhibiting effects of being first in the conquest and colonisation of the Americas, in 
effect getting locked into an effort to reproduce contemporary European social and 
political structures just as these were heading into a long period of transformation 
(Andrien 2009: 56).  The early motor of Spanish conquest was the pursuit of silver 
and gold to return to the homeland and subsidise the costs of empire and European 
wars, with minimal interest at first in the opportunities of commerce in a wider array 
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of commodities.  Moreover, the Spanish sought to reproduce the manorial system 
associated with European feudalism, with vast estates (encomienda) and Indian labour 
tied to estates and their owners, on the model of European peasantries.  As Pagden 
(1995) puts it: “Whereas the Spanish ‘were overwhelmingly concerned with rights 
over people’ the British and French stressed ‘rights in things,’ mostly lands” (cited in 
Morgan and Greene 2009: 17), but including people treated as things, i.e. slaves.  As a 
result of toppling indigenous Aztec and Inca empires and then incorporating (by 
subjugating) diverse Indian communities, as opposed to the North American pattern 
of warfare and displacement westward, the Spanish were led to reconstruct a medieval 
hierarchical social order, albeit with race (castas) and faith as additional markers of 
how the lower indigenous orders fit into the system.  The Spanish colonisers also 
brought with them a highly centralised bureaucratic order.  Despite some disputes 
regarding claims over the bodies and souls of indigenous peoples, the imperial 
bureaucracy of Crown appointees and the Catholic Church, via various religious 
orders in the first instance, formed an overarching framework that attempted to span 
and organise the vast landmass of New Spain.  The Spanish empire was, uniquely, an 
attempt to build the ancien regime in the ‘new world’. 
 
The French imperial system never gained as firm a foothold in the Americas.   
Territories in Canada, Louisiana and the Caribbean were geographically disjunct and 
diverse, and numbers of French settlers relatively small.  The North American 
territories were sparsely populated by French settlers, and often remained effectively 
under the control of Native American groups, especially in the Ohio and Mississippi 
Valleys.  The Caribbean islands were by far the most economically valuable, 
receiving the largest migration from France, but ‘[e]ven if French migration is 
estimated generously and slave imports are estimated very conservatively, enslaved 
Africans made up at least two-thirds of the population that came into the French 
Americas’ (Dubois 2009:139).  In contrast to the sprawling Spanish empire, the 
French one was tightly centred on the sugar producing and exporting islands of the 
Caribbean, dense slavery based societies assembled for purposes trade, which 
eventually erupted in their own revolution on Saint-Dominigue (Haiti) 2.  But in 
common with the Spanish system, the French colonies were governed through a 
highly centralised imperial bureaucracy, linked by ‘a single state agency, the Marine, 
which connected the Royal Government to the colonies, oversaw the navy, and 
infused much of the governance of the colonies with a military ethos’  (Ibid.: 141). 
 
For our account, by far the most significant aspect of the French colonial project, is 
how it was bound up with competition with Britain for domination and influence in 
Europe, with the Americas as something of an adjunct to that struggle (Colley 1992).  
Ongoing conflicts along the frontier between the British and French territories, with 
the Iroquois Confederacy in between negotiating on both fronts, eventually fed into a 
transatlantic war (1754-1763), styled the ‘Seven Years War’ in Europe and the 
‘French and Indian War’ in North America (Phillips 2009: 256).  France’s defeat 
meant the cession of Louisiana to Spain (1763), and the rest of its North American 
colonies to Britain (see Figure 4).  In turn, when the British colonists rebelled in 1776, 
the French supported the rebels, stimulating the traffic in radical political ideas 
between the two societies.  We look more closely at the causes and impact of the 
Eighteenth Century revolutions below.  Here it suffices to underscore that this 
dynamic of imperial competition and conflict had the effect of generating a shared 
Jonathan Hearn: 'The Origins of Modern Nationalism in the North Atlantic Interaction 
Sphere', Sociological Research Online 14:5. (2009) 
 
 8 
Anglo-French universe of radical critiques and conservative apologies for the old 
political orders. 
 
 
Compared to the Spanish and French Empires, the British Empire in North America 
was a piecemeal and relatively unsystematic affair, and that difference had significant 
consequences.  Early efforts at colonisation, from the 1580s to the 1620s sought to 
emulate and compete with the Spanish example.  But gradually over the next hundred 
years a more economically realistic and regionally diversified pattern emerged, as 
dreams of gold were replaced by profits from new commodities such as tobacco.  Two 
factors need emphasis.  First, the colonisation process in the Seventeenth Century was 
deeply affected by the English Civil War in the homeland.   As Burnard comments: 
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A major difference between events in British America and those in French and 
Spanish America … was that in British America the breakdown in authority 
came early in the settlement process, even before that authority had been fully 
established (2009: 117). 
 
Thus early on settler leaders became used to running their own affairs with relative 
disregard for the Crown, a situation that was not reversed by the Restoration.  
Notwithstanding this autonomy however, many of the conflicts engendered by the 
Civil War were reproduced in the colonies, indicating the underlying shared universe 
of politico-religious ideas and debates (Elliott 2006: 147).   
 
Secondly, there was a diversity of bases for colonial settlement and self-government. 
The original English colonies were established, and sometimes re-established and 
reincorporated, through a variety of charters issued either by the king or the king and 
parliament together.  These were issued to enterprising individuals or small groups, 
chartered companies, or held directly by the Crown and administered by an appointed 
governor.  Thus the intentions behind the establishment of these colonies were varied, 
although the predominant motives, in varying ratios, concerned the pursuit of 
economic profit and establishing denominationally based communities free from 
religious persecution.  Combined with a formative condition of detachment from the 
metropole, the result was a variety of systems of in situ administration.  Early 
assemblies, with relatively extensive franchises compared to England, were 
established in Virginia (1619) and Bermuda (1620) to help regulate public order, ease 
administration, and raise needed taxes.  Unlike the viceroyalties of New Spain, the 
British colonies routinely institutionalised representative assemblies, a move made 
more likely by the fact that ‘voting was an established feature of joint stock 
companies, and was therefore likely to be transferred with relative ease to colonial 
settlements operating under company charters’ (Elliott 2006: 135).  In the long run 
this patchwork impulse towards systems of self-government yielded such robust and 
varied results that when revolution arrived, the framers of the new constitution 
struggled mightily to get agreement on an overarching system from the states of the 
former colonies jealously guarding their own systems and interests (Greene 2006). 
 
Revolutions  
 
By ‘revolutions’ I mean not just the events themselves, but the wider ideological 
context that led to them.   I would also stress that the old European regime had been a 
‘dual’ regime in which authority and legitimacy were mutually invested in both civil 
and ecclesiastical powers.  Therefore the decline of the old regime needs to be 
understood as taking place in two major phases: first the Reformation and the 
fragmentation of the centralised authority of the Catholic Church, and then in the 
sequence of revolutions that either toppled, circumscribed, or abandoned monarchical 
authority.  Because of this two-stage process, the narrative of the formation of modern 
nations inevitably involves a ‘proto’ stage (e.g. Breuilly 2001: 34-35) in which radical 
protestant reform movements prefigure demotic, if not truly democratic, aspects of 
later nation formation (cf. Gorski 2000).  The late historian Martin Malia has 
magnificently traced the evolution of major political revolutions, originating in and 
radiating out of Europe, creating the modern world in the process (2006, see also 
Kooster 2009).   Between an initial proto-phase of religiously formed revolutions 
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bound up with the Reformation (e.g. Hussites in Bohemia, Lutherans in Germany, 
Huguenots in France), and a final phase of secular and socialist revolutions that 
characterised the Twentieth Century, he locates the ‘classic Atlantic revolutions’ 
(Malia 2006: Part II), namely in England/Britain 1640-1688, the British North 
American colonies 1776-1787, and France 1789-179.  Together, in their 
interconnections and divergences, these define the arc of modern nation formation in 
the North Atlantic interaction sphere. 
 
The ‘English’  (but more broadly British) revolution of the Seventeenth Century must 
be considered first because of the way it conditioned the revolution in the British 
colonies.  This was a piecemeal and incomplete affair.  First a Civil War (1641-1651) 
led to the replacement of monarchy by a commonwealth (1649-1653) and then 
Protectorate (1653-1659) under Cromwell, then monarchy was restored (1660), and 
finally the kingly lineage was changed in the Glorious Revolution (1688), bringing in 
the properly Protestant House of Hanover, and guaranteeing Parliament’s powers in 
relation to the monarchy.  It was a struggle conducted within, rather than against, the 
horizons of religion and monarchy (apart from the anomaly of the Cromwellian 
interregnum).  It asserted the freedom of confessional groups, and of Parliament, from 
royal interference, but it did this in terms of an imagined re-assertion of traditional 
liberties that had been abused.  This was revolution understood by most of the actors 
involved not as fundamental change, but as a return to the proper order of things; and 
a defence of the traditional liberties not of individual persons, but of institutions, of 
churches and parliaments (Malia 2006: 158-160; 210-211). 
 
As already indicated, the colonising of British North America was shaped, both 
pragmatically and ideologically, by the effects of the English Civil War.  But this did 
not mean a rejection of the British monarchical system, indeed, there were strong 
royalist traditions in the vernacular culture of the colonies well into the Eighteenth 
Century (McConville 2006).  The tensions that led to the War of Independence were, 
very much as in that previous revolution, couched as a defence of traditional English 
liberties against unwarranted trespasses, although now the source of those incursions 
was the British Parliament itself, viewed as corrupt, effete and arrogant, rather than 
the Crown.  The king was seen as failing to provide a check on this parliamentary 
abuse of power, not as the main impetus behind it.  General commitment to monarchy 
only collapsed during the decade leading up to 1776, as pressures from the metropole 
to pay new taxes to help offset the costs the Seven Years War intensified.  Then the 
full revolutionary ideology took shape, often expressing almost paranoid fears of a 
conspiracy in Parliament to destroy traditional liberties, and taking that final, often 
reluctant step toward full rejection of the monarchical system (Bailyn 1992).   As 
Malia wryly notes: 
 
Ideologically, the Americans began their struggle in the long afterglow of 
1688—that is, as an attempt to defend their historic rights as Englishmen.  But 
they ended it, both literally and figuratively, on the eve of 1789—that is, with 
a citizen’s republic, that the French were then readying to radicalise and 
universalize further still (2006: 163). 
 
This ‘overshooting of the mark’ was due to the unique combination of a distinctively 
European, and English/British, ideological struggle over the nature of sovereignty, 
playing out in the colonial context of relative distance and autonomy from the 
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homeland.  The ideological repertoire was largely the same, but the old regime itself 
was materially and institutionally remote, and practically supplanted by the colonial 
social networks and forms of government that developed in the previous 150 years, 
and provided an organisational infrastructure for political action (Malia 2006: 177).  
In this context it was easier, and made more sense, to make a full break and begin 
anew. 
 
If the Seven Years War triggered conflicts that ultimately led to American 
Independence, and spelled the end of France’s American empire, France’s retaliatory 
support for the American War of Independence led its monarchy to bankruptcy, and 
set the stage for its revolution (see Anderson 2000).  If the great cry of the American 
Revolution was for the defence of ‘liberty’, now understood as the liberty of persons 
bearing rights, and not just those of institutions as in the English Revolution, the 
central cry of the French Revolution was for ‘equality’.   Malia argues that whereas 
the American patriot elites were rebelling against a remote but overweening political 
authority infringing on liberties, the French onees were rebelling against ‘a legally 
privileged social stratum, the hereditary nobility, indeed against the whole starkly 
hierarchical estate system’ (2006:210).  Where the American revolutionaries 
experienced a degree of prejudice from the metropole toward their relatively 
unsophisticated colonial habitus and manners, the French revolutionaries experienced 
an acute dissonance, when despite high degrees of education and worldly experience, 
they were disbarred by birth from the social status they felt they deserved.  Thus 
‘equality’ was their solution. 
 
Beneath these individual political crises, each with its specific circumstances, lies a 
more general North Atlantic-European crisis of the Old Regime.  Despite their 
ideological, institutional, and social structural difference, these three Revolutions 
were socially intertwined.  Let me stress three points. 
 
First, it is a truism that the period in question was shaped by Enlightenment thought 
embodied in widely read and debated works by those such as Locke, Harrington, 
Hume, and Rousseau.  To wit: ‘The Virginian planter, Landon Carter, inherited from 
his father the 1700 folio edition of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
and his annotations show him quite prepared to engage in debate with “this great 
man”’ (Elliott 2006: 332).  This discursive field had material underpinnings.  Robert 
Wuthnow has argued that by the mid-Seventeenth Century mercantilist strategies had 
become well-established and stabalised in Europe, stimulating the growth of much 
larger state bureaucracies, particularly in Britain, France and Prussia.  This in turn 
provided institutional support and livelihoods for the social stratum of ‘public 
officials, administrators, parliamentary representatives, courtiers, lawyers, 
professionals, military officers, men and women of leisure, university faculty, and in 
some cases clergy associated with the hierarchies of the state’ (1989: 312), who were 
key in promoting the growth of publishing and a public sphere for the exchange of 
ideas.  And these yielded intellectual, diplomatic and social networks that spanned 
British and French societies.  Thus the very dynamic of interstate competition that 
drove the dynasties of Britain and France across the Atlantic in search of wealth, and 
into costly and debilitating imperial wars, was also generating the social conditions 
for a ferment of ideas that would end up challenging monarchical political authority 
and legitimacy, in different ways, in both countries. 
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Second, the neo-classical ideas informing this period had pre-enlightenment roots in 
the Renaissance Florence, where Machiavelli and his lesser contemporaries 
articulated ideas of republicanism, patriotism, civic virtue, and the need to balance 
powers, that were rearticulated through influential figures such as James Harrington 
(Pocock 2003, Viroli 1995).  Thus a set of ideas originally formulated in the context 
of the specific problems of mercantile city-states dominated by powerful families, a 
kind of polity that existed in the interstices of much larger dynastic states that 
dominated Europe, eventually found fuller application when some of those dynastic 
states expanded into over-extended, over-seas empires, and groups within them 
interpreted their own situations as conditions of illegitimate domination. 
 
Finally, the traffics in ideas, key figures, and peoples, were transatlantic, and fed into 
the growing phenomenon of ‘public opinion’ among literate urban classes.  The 
critique of government corruption articulated by the British American colonists had 
its corollary in the similar contemporary critiques made by John Wilkes as a Member 
of Parliament in England (Bailyn 1992: 110-112).   It is not just that the printed word 
diffused ideas throughout the colonies and across the Atlantic, but the persons who 
used those ideas and words themselves most effectively in many cases travelled back 
and forth, as in the journeys of Benjamin Franklin, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, 
Marquis de La Fayette, and Thomas Paine.  More generally soldiers, sailors, 
merchants and government officials, routinely traversed the Atlantic, which both 
separated and connected the two shores.  Politically discontent Europeans took great 
interest in American events, and French radicals specifically debated the merits of the 
American system and its various state constitutions in the years leading up to the 1789 
(Palmer 1959: 326). As R. R. Palmer observed: 
 
This growth of communication was obviously one of the fundamental 
preconditions to the whole revolutionary era.  It had enabled the Thirteen 
Colonies to stage a collective resistance to England, it now made America and 
Europe feel together, and it undermined, in Europe, the whole idea of 
government as a kind of private occupation of limited governmental circles 
(1959: 243). 
 
  
Diverse Communities   
 
If empires and revolutions provide the bolder strokes in this picture, it is necessary to 
say something also about a range of other kinds of community, which further 
elaborated the universe of comparison.  Narrowing in particularly on British North 
America at this point, I consider the roles of Indians, slaves, Protestants and pirates, 
as foils for communal imaginings. 
 
The symbolic use of indigenous peoples of the Americas in European social and 
political thought, most famously in Rousseau’s image of the ‘noble savage’, is well 
known.  But there is a further question about the more direct impact of actual social 
encounters between Indians and Europeans.   By far the most significant native group 
for early colonial North America was the Iroquois.  This loose and sometimes factious 
‘confederacy’ of linguistically related matrilineal groups, the Mohawks, Oneidas, 
Onandagas, Cayugas and Senecas, often called ‘the Five Nations’, was located in 
what became upstate New York, west of the Hudson River and south of Lake Ontario.  
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Probably formed to reduce warfare and conflict between the groups in the 100 years 
before European contact, the confederacy evolved from a cluster of horticultural and 
hunting groups, into a militarised intermediary of the beaver fur trade, first with the 
Dutch and then the English.  They made alliances with the Europeans, waged war on 
their Indian neighbours to capture hunting territories and pelts, and provided a buffer 
toward the French and their Algonquin allies to the north.  For a period they were a 
force to be reckoned with, but the different ‘nations’ made conflicting and shifting 
alliances during French and Indian Wars and the American War of Independence, 
ultimately fragmenting the confederacy (see Anderson 2000: 11-32, White 1991, 
Richter and Merrell 1987). 
 
A lore has developed that the Iroquois commanded a powerful indigenous empire, and 
that their notions of government significantly influenced the constitutional ideas of 
the founders of the United States.  Reinvigorated in the 1980s and 1990s, the 
‘Iroquois influence thesis’ has been debated and effectively criticised (Johansen 1990, 
Tooker 1988, Levy 1996).  While there was diplomatic contact between the Iroquois 
and figures such Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, among others, these seem 
to have largely concerned the pragmatics of power relations on the frontier, and any 
admiration for the vigour and liberty of the Iroquois, as representatives of indigenous 
Americans more generally, appears to have been mixed with a clear sense of the 
ultimate superiority of European ways.  But while the Iroquois had minimal influence 
on American constitutional thought, that is not to say they had no symbolic 
significance for the colonists, radicals and founders.  Linda Colley (1992: 132-145) 
has highlighted the British artistic convention around the time of the American 
Revolution, of representing ‘America’, i.e. the British American colonists as a 
constituent part of the British Empire, as a romanticised Indian princess: 
 
The main reason why an American Indian was used to symbolise the Thirteen 
Colonies was, of course, that their white inhabitants had yet to evolve a 
recognisable and autonomous identity of their own … On the one hand, it 
summoned up the idea of a noble savage and was therefore well suited to 
those Britons who wanted to idealise America as a second Eden, a haven 
untouched by the corruption and luxury of the Old World.  On the other hand, 
the image of an American Indian carried with it also an element of menace, 
and this I suspect was often deliberate.  Well-informed Britons at this time 
were not unaware that imperial dominion might in the future shift from their 
own small island to the massive continent inhabited by their American 
colonists.  Dixon’s [the artist’s] Indian princess carries a bow and arrows.  Far 
more than her sisters in empire, even Britannia, whose spear rests casually 
beside her, she is a warrior, a possible threat (Ibid: 134-135). (See Figure 5) 
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Figure 5, Courtesy of the Trustees of the British Museum. 
 
Perhaps it is in this context that we should interpret that famous ‘Boston Tea Party’ 
(1773), in which the rebellious, tax-rejecting colonists dressed up as Mohawks when 
they boarded the ships and threw the cargo overboard.  Though it may have obscured 
individual identities, from the beginning the disguise appears to have fooled no-one, 
and cast no blame on the Mohawks themselves.  It may be that these colonists were 
embracing that threatening identity, and asserting their rough-hewn liberty, by 
deploying a commonly understood symbolic language. 
 
If the American Indian could provide a symbol of liberty, the American slave clearly 
could not.  But slaves, despite their material subjugation, were nonetheless 
symbolically relevant in, and in a way constitutive of, the discourse of American 
independence.  The manifest contradiction of a slave-holding society declaring that 
‘all men are created equal’ is often remarked upon.  Francois Furstenberg (2003) has 
argued that what has been missed here is a set of ideas prevalent at the time that 
viewed freedom not simply as a birthright, but as something that had to be asserted 
and earned through active resistance, and those that fail to adequately resist, such as 
the African slaves, in effect endorsed their subjugated status.  Beginning with a 
statement that ‘nations are as free as they deserved to be’, attributed to Samuel Adams 
by Benjamin Rush, reflecting on the heady days of revolution in correspondence with 
John Adams in 1812, Furstenberg explores a neglected context of the term ‘slavery’.  
He points out that at the time it was commonly used to describe any threats to 
freedom, not simply the case of humans treated as chattels.  Thus resistance to British 
parliamentary authority was repeatedly couched as a rejection of ‘enslavement’ (and 
this usage interpenetrated with protestant fears and references to ‘popish slavery’). 
This usage no doubt arose partly out of a heightened rhetoric that sought to legitimate 
active, violent resistance, and glorify personal sacrifice in the revolutionary cause 
(e.g. Patrick Henry’s ‘give me liberty or give me death’).  And it again underscores 
the distinction made earlier between a French revolutionary discourse that stressed a 
levelling equality, and an American one that sought in the first instance to defend 
existing liberty, a difference that tends to get elided in historical retrospect.  In the 
popular imagination of the time, the argument was not that slavery was wrong 
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(though many believed this), but that ‘we will not be slaves’ (to echo Rule Britannia), 
and the existence of slaves within the society provided a concrete point of negative 
comparison, not just a moral embarrassment, as we might assume it should today (see 
also Bailyn 1992: 232-246). 
 
If Indians and slaves provided foils for the identities of the British colonists in North 
America, so did the numerous, mainly Protestant religious communities they imported 
with them from eastern shores.  The very founding of the colonies was in part as a 
series of regional, religiously-based sub-societies: Anglicans in Virginia, 
Congregationalists in New England, Quakers in Pennsylvania, a small community of 
Catholics in Maryland, with Presbyterians, Baptists, Lutherans, Mennonites and 
others flowing into the mix.  Original aspirations towards religiously pure 
communities, with a few exceptions, gave way to the sheer force of religiously 
diverse in-migration, resulting in a dynamic religious pluralism, underwritten by a 
shared culture of bible-focused Christianity.  And this diversity, combined with the 
memory of civil strife caused by churches with too much worldly power, and a 
general drift towards deism among some of the more educated, inhibited the 
establishment of any overarching orthodoxy in the colonies (Elliott 2006: Ch. 5).  
Instead, the religious movement called ‘The Great Awakening’ led by ministers such 
as Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) generated an ecumenical religious culture that 
undergirded this sectarian diversity (Johnson 1997: 119).  Thus, while the British 
colonies by the mid-1700s lacked integrated religious identities and institutions that 
might serve to ideologically organise them and differentiate them from their peers in 
the metropole, by the same token, they had before them repeated examples of efforts 
to imagine and bring into being new, intentional communities, and an increasingly 
shared religious idiom of thought, that served to underwrite a common political 
language.  The business of imagining and founding communities (and in figures such 
as the entrepreneurial founder of Quaker Pennsylvania, William Penn, it was a kind of 
‘business’) was something the Americans had become uniquely accustomed to.  By 
the time of the revolution, they had had considerable practice.  
 
We also need to remember that sea-going was itself a way of life, whether based on 
the exploitation of sea resources such as cod and whale (Bolster 2008), or the more 
general role of the sea as a mode of traffic for land-derived commodities and people, 
both slave a free.   Sailing ships, and sea-going livelihoods, with their peculiar and 
heavy demands on time, skill and labour, provided a kind of alternate or sub-society, 
linked to, and linking, the societies on the western and eastern shores of the Atlantic.  
The ‘impressing’ of vagabonds into service in the growing English/British navy, often 
under dictatorial naval commanders, created a particularly intense situation of 
dependency and resentment among many crews (Hill 1996: 162-176).  Linebaugh and 
Rediker have argued that: 
 
Sailors were prime movers in the cycle of rebellion, especially in North 
America, where they helped to secure numerous victories for the movement 
against Great Britain between 1765 and 1776.  They led a series of riots 
against impressments beginning in the 1740s, moving Thomas Paine (in 
Common Sense) and Thomas Jefferson (in the Declaration of Independence) to 
list that practice as a major grievance.  Their militancy in port grew out of 
their daily work experience at sea, which combined coordinated cooperation 
with daring initiative.  Sailors engaged on board ship in collective struggles 
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over food, pay, work, and discipline, and they brought to the ports a militant 
attitude towards arbitrary and excessive authority, and empathy for the 
troubles of others, and a willingness to cooperate for the sake of self-defense 
(2000: 214). 
 
These authors further suggest that the most developed expression of the sailor’s 
militancy and spirit of independence is found in the later variants of piracy in the 
North Atlantic.  Originally growing out of privateers such as Francis Drake, 
empowered by the English Crown to prey upon the Spanish navy and the riches it 
extracted from the new world, by the early Eighteenth Century, with the British navy 
in ascendancy, pirate ships no longer found favour as agents of the British state, and 
instead went into business for themselves.  Linebaugh and Rediker (see also Rediker 
1987) maintain that the ‘pirate ship was democratic in an undemocratic age’ (Ibid.: 
162), with crews enjoying a large hand in decision making, distribution of spoils, and 
ultimately the legitimation of the captain’s authority, which only went unquestioned 
in the heat of chase and battle.  These arguments suffer from a somewhat 
romanticised view of pirates as proto-proletarians in a struggle against early 
capitalism, but the facts that sailors could be volatile in relation to the larger social 
order, and that ship-board life provided a unique natural laboratory for experiments in 
both harsh domination and collective self-determination, is well documented. 
 
In this section I have been trying to convey, not so much ‘influences’ on the 
formation of the idea of the modern nation, as a general atmosphere of social 
contrasts, possibilities, and opportunities, that I suggest served to quicken the 
imagination.  Anderson’s account of the ‘creole pioneers’ first imaginings of 
nationhood places great emphasis on their sense of exclusion from opportunities in 
the metropole and the wider empire, due to their diminished status as colonials (1991: 
57-58).  And this was certainly the case in the American colonies where, for instance, 
as an able soldier and commander, George Washington might have gone on to an 
imperial military career in the British Army, if not for the condescending attitude 
towards colonial army officers held by the leaders of the British Army in London 
(Johnson 1997: 132-133).  To this notion of structural barriers that encouraged the 
development of a distinctive, oppositional national identity, I am trying to add a sense 
of an encompassing environment, which at every turn stimulated the imagination in 
response to such frustrations. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
I have argued that the origins of modern nationalism should be explained, not as an 
endogenous transformation of one or a few societies in western Europe, which then 
radiates out from that core, but instead as emerging from an historically specific 
‘interaction sphere’ that existed around the North Atlantic during the long Eighteenth 
Century.   The idea of the interaction sphere is meant to guide our attention away 
from named social units—nations, states, peoples—and toward overarching patterns 
of relations and exchanges among them.  This first step helps us see, with Tilly, the 
importance of conflict-laden interactions between social units in driving social 
change, and the error of allowing individual states and societies to become 
autonomous protagonists in the drama of social transformation.  There are many 
different orders of things interacting in this account: empires, revolutions, sub-
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societies, states, ideologies, and ideologues, to name a few.  What makes any 
particular one salient is how it fits into a larger pattern of explanation. 
 
Two processes have been central in my account of this interaction sphere.  First, 
expanding communication.  By this I have meant not just the spread of literacy and 
printed matter (Anderson 1991) and the exchange of ideas (Deutsch 1953) so often 
emphasised, but communication in its broader sense of movement and the means of 
movement.  Just as, at a later point, the building of roads was bound up with the 
building of nations (Weber 1976: 195-220), in the period in question, oceanic travel 
routes provided the sinews along which ideas moved, ideas which both forged new 
nations, and unhinged monarchical empires.  Second, changing terms of political 
authority and legitimacy.  To understand how modern nations emerged, we have to 
understand how Britain lost its American colonies, and France lost its aristocracy.  
These are two sides of the same process, in which existing structures of authority and 
legitimacy fail, and new ones, based on still forming notions of a self-governing 
people, step into the breech.  It is this new conception of authority and legitimation, 
whether conceived as a ‘liberal demos’ or an ‘organic ethnos’ (Mann 2005: 55-69), 
that defines the modern nation, and has inspired nationalist movements ever since (cf. 
Armitage 2007).  
 
Finally, the narrative image here is not one of a bounded plot that has a beginning, 
middle and end.  Instead there is a central axis of a larger transition, the causes of 
which trail of into the past, and the consequences of which continue to the present.  
Although the American Revolution stands at the centre of my story, this is not to 
endow the British colonists of North America with exceptional historical agency, nor 
would I bestow that role on the French revolutionaries who stand near the centre as 
well.  In all the Atlantic revolutions, events tended to spin out of control, leading to 
collective actions that were far beyond and different from what those involved 
initially envisioned.  These revolutions are better imagined as the epicentres of a 
large, transformative historical process in which events beyond anyone’s ultimate 
control led to profound political innovation.  But that innovation, however contingent 
in the first instance, became persistent, and provided a model for future social and 
political evolution, precisely because it tended to endow these new political systems 
with greater capacities to generate and mobilise social power, gradually spelling the 
decline of the older model of imperial polity, in the Americas, back in Europe, and 
across the world. 
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1 This article engages with approaches that regard nationalism as an aspect of the 
formation of modernity, leaving aside approaches that treat it as having origins in 
historically deeper processes of ethnicity. 
2 For reasons of space I have not tried to address the Haitian Revolution, which was 
also a significant though less consequential part of this nexus of eighteenth-century 
Atlantic revolutions.  See Blackburn (2006). 
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